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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REX P.ACE, BYRON P.\CE, KEITH PACE· 
AND H.\R\'EY PACE 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
YS. 
JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E. PARRISH 
Defendants and Appellants. 
INTRODUCTION 
A few comments on the brief submitted by respon-
dents seem necessary. 
POINT I: APPELLANT'S BRIEF CONTAINED A 
FAIR STATEMENT OF THE IMPORTANT FACTS IN 
THE CASE ... 
A. There was no intention of misleading the Court 
when we made the statement that plaintiffs had contracted 
to sell their farm in Boeneta, Utah, for $50,000.00. The 
record is clear on this point, ( Tr. 28). If there was only an 
offer and not a contract, we apologize for our lack of care 
in setting forth this relatively unimportant matter. 
We think that plaintiffs also, in the heat of their 
argument, unintentionally colored other facts. On page 
16 of their brief, they have Mr. Parrish standing at point 
A and pointing to the Rollin's land, whereas the testimony 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
shows that they were all seated in the car when Parrish 
is alleged to have said, "Brethren, all the land you see 
down there belong to me," ( 'fr. 32). 
Likewise, on the top of the next page of their brief, 
plaintiffs would have us believe that the Rollin's tract of 
11% acres, ~~mile away was "the most clearly visible tract 
of land in their view," they represent that a tract of land 
7~ mile away was more clearly visible to the parties than 
the land surrounding the car in which they were seated. 
_B. We are accused of attempting to mislead the 
, Court by- failing to make reference to a statement of one 
Reynolds Blackington to the effect, "If the deal went 
through, the reservoir went with the place." This accusa-
-tion deserves more serious consideration. 
We admit that the Blackington statement was denied 
a place in our brief. Our reason was-.- It did not deserve 
serious . consideration. 
It was Blackington, friend of Rex Pace, who remained 
in the car while Rex inquired of the defendants if their 
land was for sale. It was Blackington who said that 
Parrish, crippled as he was, walked out of the house, down 
the steps_ and out to the car to discuss a deal that had 
already bee? ]Jlaqe. It was witness Blackington who con-
viently overheard this one single statement (now relied 
up by respondents) as the most vital in thi's entire dispute. 
It was Blackington' whom Parrish testified he ·had never 
seen prior to the date of the trial. It was Blackinton who 
overheard a -statement that was neither pleaded nor testi-
fied to by either of the plaintiffs. 
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We suggest that the statement is very similar to the 
statement that the reservoir is on my land. It is not a 
direct statement that, "all of the water rights in the reser-
voir are used on my land;,;, or, "that I own all the water 
rights.~' For the puropse of establishing fraud ·there 
should be a distinction between a reservoir itself and the 
water rights in that reservoir. So first the statement has 
to be enlarged to make the reservoir include all the water 
rights in the reservoir. But the plaintiffs' own evidence 
is that they could not put to benefical use more than half 
the water rights from the reservoir in this farm, ( Tr. 48). 
Plaintiff is here attempting to establish fraud by producing 
a witness who is willing to put the general statement in 
the mouth of the defendant that the "reservoir went with 
the place." It should be remembered that such a state-
ment is very easy to make but it goes all too far. The 
plaintiff had no right to believe it under the circumstances 
any more than he had a right to establish fraud by the 
statement, ''I own all the land you can see down there." 
The slightest investigation would have shown there were 
neighbors to the land, that the ditches from the reservoir 
reached the premises of the neighbors and that part of 
the water rights in the reservoir were owned by these 
same neighbors. 
May we not be pardoned for thinking this testimony 
of little importance? Even plaintiff realizes its weakness, 
for he feels the need of it needing support by inserting 
something entirely foreign to the record. That the Jury, 
"Were undoubtedly aware of Mr. Blackington's reputation 
for truth and honesty." 
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C. If, "Respondents absolutely never examined the 
river bottom land in section 19," then what is the meaning 
of their testimony, ( Tr. 60) where they testify they rode 
over the river bottom land twice and got out and made an 
inspection of the river bottom land? If they never examined 
the land, how did they know that it had never been 
plowed? (Tr. 45), and that it was covered with sage? 
(Tr. 46). 
D. On page 4 of respondents' brief, they say they 
made no request for special interrogatories, but on page 41, 
of the same brief, they say they requested them. 
(A. 37-41 ). 
For the most part, the issues are 'Clearly set forth in 
the principal brief. We assert error, and they deny it. 
Where the issues are thus clearly set forth, there is no 
need of further comment. 
But on page 13 of their brief, a new doctrine is intro-
duced. Respondents contended that there may be fraud 
and deceit by innuendo. We submit that if the doctrine 
of fraud and deceit by innuendo ever finds a place in the 
jurisprudence of this State, it should not be introduced 
when mature men are making a land contract. 
The· second new element introduced by respondents 
is a statement of the general rule that where a confidential 
relationship exists, fraud may be practiced by suppressing 
facts, or by the telling of a half truth. The insertion of 
-this new element in the case is at least a tacit admission 
by the plaintiffs that there was no actual, direct misrepre-
sentation. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
'Ve find no fault with this general statement of a law, 
even though it cannot be found at 23 Am. Jur. 956. We 
differ \Vith respondents in their application of this general 
rule to the facts in the instant case. 
POINT II: THERE WAS NO CONFIDENTIAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE 
CONTRACT ... 
Was there a confidential relationship existing between 
_these parties? The only. evidence cited by respondents in 
their brief is that the defendant called the plaintiffs 
''brethren." Surely the Court is not going to lay down a 
. rule of la\v for this state, that when ever one party calls 
the other 'brother" a confidential relationship exists. 
\Ve find that Courts have upheld that a confidential 
relationship exists in case of dealings between physician 
and client, land broker and agent, and, in some cases, 
where director and stockholder are dealing with each 
other. Where Bolander vs. Thompson, 134 Pac. 2nd, 924, 
a patient and nurse were dealing with each other, and in 
Anderson vs. Lloyd, 139 P. 2nd 244, former partners were 
dealing with each other, in Baker vs. Baker, 171 A.L.R. 
447, a divorced couple were dealing with each other. In 
all these cases, under the circumstances, the Court found 
a confidential relationship, but these cases are entirely 
.. different from strangers dealing with each other, and one 
·calling the other "brother." 
POINT III: THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR DE·CEIT 
BY WILFUL CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
OR STATEMENT OF A HALF TRUTH ... 
Assuming no confidential relationship, is there deceit 
by wilful concealment of material facts? 
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THE RESERVOIR 
Suppose we refer to the general picture. A tentative 
agreement had been made between Rex Pace and Joseph 
A. Parrish for the sale of the Parrish farm. This agreement 
was to be binding, if approved by the father and the other 
two sons, after an inspection of the farm. Three plaintiffs, 
all matured men, one from Ogden, a nearby town, and the 
others from Duchesne County, in the same state, all ex-
perienced in operating irrigated land, call on the owner, 
and aged farmer, 75 years of age, and invite him to ac-
company them on an inspection trip. In the course of 
their inspection, they come to a large, man-made reservoir 
and there, according to the plaintiff, ( Tr. 30), Parrish 
simply said, "This is the reservoir." In that simple state-
ment, there. was no wilful concealment of material facts .. 
or the wilful telling of a half truth. Was the defendant 
under any duty, because of this casual statement, to go 
on and explain that others had an interest in the water in 
the reservoir, when that question was never put to him? 
Admitting, but not concealing, there was another dis-
cussion as to the ownership of the reservoir on a previous 
occasion. Was there a wilful concealment of a material 
fact in that first interview? 
This is the testimony: Question by Mr. Fuller, "Was 
there any discussion relative to how much water was on 
the place?" Answer by Rex Pace, he said, "I own the 
reservoir; the reservoir is on my place." 
We know nothing of the circumstances surrounding 
this statement. The record is silent as to what question 
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called for such a reply. Knowing nothing of the circum-
stances, can 've charge defendant with a wilful conceal-
nlent of a material fact. 
An another occasion, prior to the signing of the agree-
ment, three of the plaintiffs were conversing with Wallace 
Parrish concerning the construction of the reservoir. There 
was a frank and complete revelation of all of the facts. 
"\Vallace told them that others had an interest in the 
reserYoir, (Tr. 165, 168, 170). 
If respondents had listened to Wallace Parris? they 
would have known; if, in that six weeks period between 
the inspection trip and the signing of the contract they 
had investigated, they would have found out; and if they 
had inquired of defendant, Joseph A. Parrish, at any time, 
they would have been told, that others had a right to use 
some of the water in the reservoir. 
Having neither listened, investigated, or inquired, 
they cannot now complain. 
THE ROLLIN'S LAND 
The position of the parties, when the alleged state-
ment was made concerning the Rollin's land, is important, 
and that fact is in dispute. Parrish remembers pointing to 
a tract of cultivated land on the sidehill and making a 
.statement concerning the land he owned as the parties 
ascended the road to the reservoir, ( Tr. 129). He is pos-
itive that the parties did not drive to point "A" during 
the inspection, (Tr. 141). The physical facts support his 
statement; the road around Rollin's field was too muddy to 
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travel, if this road was too muddy, how could the parties 
have ascended to point "A" where there was little or no 
road? If they were at the point fixed by Mr. Parrish, there 
is no deception for the Rollin's tract would not be in the 
direction of his pointing. 
If, however, in their eagerness to win, plaintiffs have 
used a simple expedient of changing the place of conver-
sation to a different point, and reported that the parties 
were facing downhill instead of uphill, then there is 
something to argue abount, otherwise not. 
In a fraud case, the burden of proof is on the parties 
asserting the fraud. Is that burden shifted when there 
is a direct conflict in the evidence? Is the burden shifted 
when the facts argue for the defendant? It must be re-
membered that it was the plaintiffs who were eager to 
buy, and not the defendants who were eager to sell; there 
is no motive for a wilful concealment. 
Further comment is necessary only to show_ the weak-
ness of plaintiffs' position. It is only when one party can-
not ascertain the facts that a wilful concealn1ent bv the 
.I 
other becomes fradulent. "It is a general rule of fraud 
that nondisclosure can form the basis of a charge of fraud 
only if there is a duty of disclosure. Accordingly, where 
the facts or means of information concerning the condition 
and value of the land are equally accessible to both the 
vendor and the purchaser, and nothing is said or done 
. by the vendor which tends to impose on the purchaser, or 
' to mislead him, there is no fraud which the law can notice 
arising from the failure of the vendor to disclose facts af-
fecting the value of the land. (55 Am. Jur. 531). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
The parties \Vere out on an inspection tour. If the 
inclusion of the Rollin's tract was of vital importance, as 
contended by plaintiffs, they would have walked to the 
Rollin's tract and used tl1e shovel as they did in the South 
field. Fraud is never presumed. We must assume that if 
the plaintiffs had even started toward the Rollin's tract, 
there \Vould have been no misunderstanding ~or they 
would have been told the truth, or had they even inquired 
\vhether the Rollin's tract belonged to Parrish when they 
drove near to it, they would have been told the true con-
dition and there would have been no deceit. Having made 
no inquiry or given any indication that they thought the 
Rollin's land was included in the land to be sold, they 
cannot now complain. 
It must also be remembered that Wallace Parrish, son 
of the vendor, testified that on the six hour ride, prior to 
signing the contract, he told them that his father no longer 
o\vned the 11~ acres. (Tr. 166-157). 
RIVER BOTTOM LAND 
Plaintiffs are either confused as to the exact location 
of the river bottom land or they are deliberately attempt-
ing to mislead the Court. Whether confusion or intent-
ional unfairness the evidence is clear that the road over 
which the parties traveled twice while on the_ inspection 
trip runs directly through the river bottom land. 
In the course of the cross examination of Rex Pace 
he appeared to be a little confused and his attorney 
prompted him by asking: 
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"Q. The river bottom land? 
A. That is right. 
Q. You went over the river bottom land twice? 
A. Along this road, yes." 
Attorney Perry then continued his cross-examination. 
"Q. You got out of the car and made an inspection 
of the river bottom land? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. There was no snow on the ground? 
A. No sir." (Tr. 59-60). 
For plaintiff to argue now that the river bottom land 
was "east some distance" from the road over which they 
had twice traveled seems very unfair. 
In a desperate attempt to sustain the verdict they 
present a new an unusual argument. That fraud may be 
practiced on another by a secret thought that is unex-
pressed. 
This is the argument: That while the parties were 
on that inspection trip and Rex Pace was telling Parrish, 
that they were going "to push down the trees" and farm 
that portion of the river bottom land that was west of the 
road, Parrish thought "Maybe they will and maybe they 
won't." ( Tr. 133). There can be no deceit because of 
this thought. 
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If he had told thein it was· good farming land when 
he had never plowed it, and it later proved deficient, he 
'vould have practiced deceit. If he had told them it was 
incapable of being farmed when he had never tried it, 
he would likewise have been in error. 
The case of Farrer vs. Churchhill, 135 U.S. 609, 34 L. 
Ed., 246 seems in point and this issue. In this case, plain-
tiff alleged damages because defendant had misrepre-
sented the amount of land overflowed by the Mississippi 
River, the Court denied relief because plaintiff had in-
spected the property. In the opinion, the Court quoted 
from an early English case of Hill vs. Thompson. Thomp-
son had sold a tract of land to Hill and he had reported 
that only 50 to 60 acres were untillable, whereas 300 acres 
were unfit for cultivation, the Court refused to grant re-
lief. An examination had been made by the vendee. The 
Court, .in its opinion, said: 
"Misrepresentation entitled to relief must be in refer-
ence to some .material thing unknown to the purchaser, 
either from not being examined, or for want of opportunity 
to be informed, or for entire confidence reposed in the 
vendor: and a concealment of material facts known to the 
vendor and unknown to the vendee, which are calcuJated 
to influence the action or operate to the prejudice of the 
vendee; if fradulent. 
But where the facts be equally open to both parties, 
with equal opportunities of examinatiol}, _and .the vendee 
undertakes to examine for himself, without relying on the 
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statements of the vendor, it is not evidence of fraud that 
the vendor knows facts not known to the vendee and does 
not disclose them to him." 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Respectively submitted, 
L. TOM PERRY, 
PRESTON AND HARRIS, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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